The aim of this paper is to elaborate a notion of explanation which is applicable to stochastic processes such as quantum processes. The model-theoretic approach was adopted in order to delimit appropriate classes, by defining set-theoretical predicates, of different kinds of physical transformations that quantum systems suffer, either of transitions or of transmutations, by interaction or in a spontaneous manner. To explain a singular quantum process consists in showing that it is feasible to model it as an indeterministic process of (...) certain specified kind. (shrink)

The main purpose of this essay is to explore the relationship between the incommensurability of paradigms or general theories, a thesis due to Kuhn and Feyerabend, and the idealizations and abstractions that permeate concepts and fundamental laws of physical theories. One can find some unrealistic or idealizational suppositions underlying the semantic level of the differences between the conceptual vocabularies of incommensurable theories, on which these theories rest. This kind of suppositions relates to the idealizations and abstractions involved in forming concepts (...) and formulating laws. Generally, the fundamental laws of physical theories have an abstract and idealized character. Physical theories contain conceptual networks of kind concepts and quantitative concepts, which are interconnected by several sorts of relationships. The discrepancies between such conceptual network, and their underlying assumptions, of alternative paradigms or theories make their comparison at a theoretical level, that is, their commensurability implausible. That at once strengthens the incommensurability thesis and further supports it. In addition, it follows that Kuhn’s philosophy of science indeed involves a version of conceptual or epistemological relativism about science. (shrink)

En este escrito se analizan ciertos conceptos del estructuralismo empirista de Bas van Fraassen, en particular, el de representación, para intentar una crítica a su posición con respecto al vínculo entre los modelos de las teorías y, en última instancia, el mundo físico por medio de los modelos de datos, a los cuales van Fraassen les adjudica el papel de representantes de los fenómenos. Al final se delinea, a muy grandes rasgos, una alternativa conceptualista.

Se analizan ciertos conceptos del estructuralismo empirista de Bas van Fraassen, en particular, el de representación, para intentar una crítica a su posición con respecto al vínculo entre los modelos de las teorías y, en última instancia, el mundo físico por medio de los modelos de datos, a los cuales van Fraassen les adjudica el papel de representantes de los fenómenos. Al final se delinea, a muy grandes rasgos, una alternativa conceptualista. The article analyzes certain concepts of the empiricist structuralism (...) of Bas van Fraassen, particularly that of representation, in order to carry out a critique of his position with respect to the link between the models of the theories and, ultimately, the physical world, through data models to which van Fraassen grants the role of representatives of phenomena. Finally, the article outlines a conceptualist alternative. (shrink)

In this paper I attempt mainly to elucidate the claim, advanced by Woorward, that the key notion to characterize physical laws is that of invariance. I draw a distinction betwen two levels of invariance in order to elaborate that thesis. I maintain that distinctive marks of the nomic status of basic laws of physics are either that they hold invariantly, within a domain of applivation, or that they fulfill some principles of symmetry. The fomer mark relatesd to the manner in (...) which physical systems change invariantly whereas the latter concerns to the invariance of the laws themselves. This view contrats with the traditional philosophical thesis that physical laws are true universal statements with a necessary character which differentiate then from accidental true generalizations, which are contingent. (shrink)

The interpretation of probability, dominant in mathematics and other scientific disciplines, that defines the probability of an event S, relatively to a sequence or class of events C, as the quotient of the number of cases in which S occurs and the total number of occurrences of events in C, that..

Could relativist theses about scientific theories be coherent with realist theses about the relationship between such theories and the physical world? This is the central issue of this paper that we approach, mainly, on Giere’s perspectival realism. We consider that his epistemological relativist theses are plausible and sustainable, but his realist thesis about the representational role that plays the theoretical models with respect to real systems as well as his thesis about true hypotheses are not. After trying to show that, (...) we delineate an epistemological version of conceptual relativism which becomes cognate with Giere’s perspectival claims but that it does not comprise realist claims. (shrink)

The main aim of this paper is to provide some probabilistic notions on causality proposed to be applied to the nomic statements which intend to give account of the indeterministic processes within the domain of a scientific theory. In general, such statements are, in more or less extent, idealized statements which rest on a variety of unrealistic suppositions. I try to show how the probability distribution over the final states of an indeterministic process changes accordingly as the nomic statement in (...) question is de-idealized by means of addition of the causally relevant factors. In order to illustrate the study I take few nomic statements from population genetics. Besides, in the course, I attempt to contrast the ideas embraced here with some of the notions of Humphreys´ ontic conceptions of causality and explanation, which are contrary to the epistemic view adopted here about those subjects. (shrink)

En este artículo expongo la concepción estructuralista de la explicación científica como unificación, que se basa en la noción de una relación de incrustación (embedding) entre modelos, en las versiones de Barthelborth y Forge. Ellos mantienen además unas tesis realistas, ciertamente distintas, sobre el poder explicativo de las teorías. Concuerdo con tal enfoque modelo-teórico pero disiento de sus tesis realistas. Primero presento unas críticas a ellas, después, desde una posición conceptualista, con menor compromiso ontológico, introduzco una tesis sobre ciertos patrones (...) metateóricos que forman parte de los marcos conceptuales de las teorías físicas, los cuales aportan tanto poder explicativo como fuerza unificadora. (shrink)

Salmón ha afirmado que su teoría de la explicación causal no es enteramente adecuada para el dominio cuántico debido a ciertas anomalías causales como el dualismo onda/partícula y, especialmente, a las correlaciones estadísticas que surgen de experimentos tipo EPR. En este escrito se analizan las nociones causales de Salmón, en las cuales se basa su teoría probabilista de la explicación, con el fin de delimitar su alcance en ese dominio mostrando que sólo abarca procesos de transición pero no procesos de (...) transmutación. Además, se propone, a muy grandes rasgos, una noción alternativa de causalidad indeterminista que pretende ser adecuada para ciertos procesos cuánticos como procesos estocásticos. Por último se arguye que si bien la explicación de las correlaciones cuánticas es un problema abierto, sería erróneo considerar que una teoría de la explicación causal, como la de Salmón, concebida y elaborada primordialmente para procesos físicos individuales, pueda y deba dar cuenta de tales correlaciones. /// Salmon has said that his theory of causal explanation is not fully adequate for the quantum domain because of certain causal anomalies such as the wave/particle dualism and, in particular, the statistical correlations which arise from EPR-type experiments. This paper analyzes Salmon's causal notions, on which his probabilistic theory of explanation is based, in order to delimit its scope within that domain by showing that it covers only transition processes but not processes of transmutation. Beside, I propose, very roughly, an alternative notion of indeterministic causality, intended to be adequate for certain quantum processes as stochastic processes. Finally, I also argue that, while the explanation of the quantum correlations is an open problem, is would be a mistake to think that a theory of causal explanation, like Salmon's, conceived and worked out primarily for individual physical processes, could and should account for such correlations. (shrink)